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ABSTRACT 
This short essay takes the opportunity presented by the paper by Patten (this issue)2 
to enter the debate concerning the relative pros and cons of quantitative versus 
qualitative research methods. Too often, this is a sterile `debate’ and in accounting 
especially, the actual lack of real debate is destructive  - manifest as it is in the 
pernicious attachment of key academic journals to a single (and largely unexamined) 
notion of what comprises good research and consequently what is permitted as 
knowledge. This restriction has additional unanticipated consequences in that it (a) 
refuses to acknowledge research findings that appear in journals other than those 
anointed by the high priests of self-styled positivism and (b) it severely limits the 
research questions that can be addressed to only those which can be perceived and 
addressed through a narrow array of method (Chua, 1986). We argue that such a 
position is untenable as well as undesirable and, following Feyerabend and Morgan 
(as well as Caldwell, McCloskey and Tashakkori & Teddlie), argue for pluralism in 
method choice grounded in a pragmatic philosophy driven firstly by a concern for the 
research problem, and an absence of a fact-value distinction. We suggest that such 
pluralism is especially important  in an area concerned with social and environmental 
issues which, ultimately, are matters of life and death and more important than trivial 
matters of ‘which method is best’, (or perhaps - more accurately - which method is 
permitted in journal X).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The title is a loose attempt to echo the famous 1930s song “T'ain't What You Do (It's the Way That You Do 
It)”.  
2
 It is appropriate to note at the outset that the paper to which we initially responded was a statistical re-
testing of the conclusions of Dhaliwal et al., (2012). That paper was to act as a straw man to which we might 
respond. Patten’s initial straw man, however, turned into a snowman as it melted away to be replaced by the 
present (excellent) piece now appearing as Patten (this issue): thus requiring that many of our original 
comments and criticisms were revised, revisited and some removed. The loss of such specificity raised the risk 
that our comments would become either too general or less insightful and less acerbic. We have attempted to 
overcome this challenge but without assuming a wide reading of the more mindless, typically North American, 
main journal “empirical” publications parading as superior knowledge of corporate social responsibility 
accounting.  
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1. Introduction 
“…. It appears increasingly clear that analytical sophistication and the playing of statistical games 
have become the overriding obsession of researchers in the area [of social and environmental 
accounting] and hence such studies, rooted as they are within the prevailing economic and political 
status quo, can be largely considered as exercises in irrelevance as far as advancing the SEAA 
agenda is concerned” (Owen, 2008b, p27) 
It is a truism – almost facile in its obviousness – that evaluating anything requires 
some means by which to evaluate it, some criteria against which to assess it. 
Evaluating research and scholarship is notoriously difficult (see, for example, Black, 
1993; Worthington and Hodgson, 2005) not just because of the impossibility of 
articulating a simple judgement on such a complex activity – let alone the 
impossibility of making any sensible measurement of the activity itself (Hofstede, 
1981) – but, most obviously, because of the diverse range of criteria against which it 
might be judged, (see, for example, Humphrey and Lee, 2008; p1). But, of course, 
the criteria we choose are likely to depend, to a fair degree, upon the extent to which 
we address - and how we then answer - the broader question of `what are we for?’. It 
is not just that such a question is largely what gives our scholarship meaning but 
also as we sit in our comfortable, molly-coddled and largely undeserved self-
absorption, we should not escape, we would argue, the notion that our privilege 
brings with it an equivalent level of responsibility. That responsibility is, it seems to 
us, to seek to address the most important of the problems that we perceive and 
which may fall within our purview and ability, (Sikka et al, 1995; Fogarty, 1998; Lee 
and Williams, 1999). And it is what we determine to be important that gives meaning 
and purpose to our research (see, for example, Jones et al, 2000) and, arguably, to 
our lives. These arguments hold especially strongly for social, environmental and 
sustainability accounting, (Owen, 2008a; 2008b).  
The reason why such concerns are so crucial to research in social, environmental 
and sustainability accounting (SEA hereafter) – as, indeed they are in corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and the whole sustainability and business “debate” more 
widely – is that the field can be (on the face of it at least) so profoundly trivial. It 
remains so superficially trivial unless one can place the theorising, the empirical work 
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or the normative imagination around SEA into some broader social, environmental, 
political and/or moral context. Any research process that creates an artificial 
distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘values’ in such a context, we would argue, seems 
patently absurd, if not downright outrageous.  
The triviality of SEA has been widely remarked upon (e.g. Spence et al, 2010). The 
practice of social, environmental and `sustainability` disclosure is so patently 
spasmodic, partial, incomplete and selective; it so obviously tells everybody virtually 
nothing about the actual social, environmental and sustainability impacts of the 
organisation or even anything about its `social and environmental performance’ 
(whatever that is); and most profoundly it fails to discharge anything that might look 
like accountability. Indeed, it is not even obvious that investors (let alone investment 
analysts) take anything other than the most marginal of risk signals from it, (see, for 
example, Murray et al, 2006; Chan & Milne, 1999; Campbell & Slack, 2008, 2011). 
With a relatively few notable exceptions, SEA disclosure appears to only make any 
sense at all as a relatively minor element in the organisational arsenal of legitimation, 
corporate preening and narcissism, perhaps signalling3, stakeholder management, 
boundary management and so on. There is no immediate empirical reason why such 
SEA might commend itself to our attention more than do (say) the dietary habits of 
board members, changes in photographic techniques or the reading habits of 
speculators. 
Equally, there seems little evidence that SEA in an internal management accounting 
context fares much better. Although within organisations SEA has slowly become 
more integrated with other mechanisms such as environmental management 
systems (see, for example, Schaltegger et al, 2008) it is not at all obvious that even 
environmental accounting is that widely practised. Equally, it is not at all obvious that 
environmental accounting is crucial to organisational functions, at least not beyond 
the broader concerns of risk management.  
And yet there at least three senses in which SEA is anything but trivial.  
First, the total volume of activity – however hollow it might be – thought of as SEA in 
annual report disclosure, in the construction of stand-alone reports, in the formulation 
of policies and institutions, in the phenomenon of assurance and related `standards`, 
                                                          
3
  But to whom and what remains distinctly vague. 
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and in the sheer effort to avoid it substantively entering the legal requirements of 
organisational functions, is very far from insubstantial, (see, for example, Hoffman 
and Ehrenfeld, 2013). This alone commends itself to our attention as the world of 
practice quite transparently considers this apparent schizophrenia well worthy of its 
efforts and resources.   
Secondly, whilst it would be very difficult to provide formal evidence of a conscious 
volition, (or perhaps even conspiracy), the steadfast refusal by business, 
accountants and politicians to engage with any notions of substantive accountability 
and/or sustainability accounting is genuinely arresting. Indeed, it goes further and 
there is clearly an absolute refusal to even consider the issues substantively. These 
refusals speak volumes to us if we have the ears to listen. 
Thirdly and consequently, as Owen (2008b) so eloquently demonstrates, any SEA 
that was substantive and which avoided capture by capitalism and managerialism 
would be profoundly disruptive of current hegemonic narratives – those both within 
and without the academy. A substantive SEA would probably demonstrate that 
corporate claims for `social responsibility` and `sustainability` were vacuous at best 
and pernicious and destructive lies at worst. It would probably show that no company 
of any size (at least in the Western world) had made a profit (however 
defined/measured) once social and environmental matters (i.e. negative externality 
costs) were factored in; it would probably expose the idea that large companies 
cannot be either responsible or sustainable (Bakan, 2005; Milne & Gray, 2013). It 
would probably clarify that the profit of companies is, more often than not, a 
combination of the appropriation of the wealth (and lives) of others, a source of 
inherent inequality and a result of using (i.e. destroying) capital (environmental and 
social) and claiming it as income. In short, something akin to a giant Ponzi scheme. 
It would show, most clearly, that we live in a world of dishonesty, oppression and 
madness.   
Now that gives– albeit potential - piquancy to this mostly (superficially) trivial activity. 
And it goes some way to suggesting some possible explanations for why the 
business and professional worlds would work so very hard to maintain this sense of 
triviality and mask the un-sustainable destruction taking place (see, for example, 
ICAEW, 2004; Willis, 2003; Fries et al, 2010; United Nations, 2002; WBCSD, 2000, 
2002a, 2002b). 
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There are many ways in which we might choose to articulate and frame the potential 
importance of SEA, but it is that importance which raises research in the field to a 
level that justifies academic privilege and freedom (Jones et al, 2000) – that, in 
effect, articulates research as a component of scholarship and as an important part 
of a project worthy of our attention. This is something that critical theorists have 
known all along (Lowe and Tinker, 1977; Tinker, 1984; Hammersley, 1995) and 
something that SEA, to varying degrees, has sought to embrace. Namely that it is 
the problematique that gives context to SEA (as any other) research and gives it (for 
example) moral, political and social value. Of course we may recognise the relative 
inability of such research to directly influence practice, the ambient political economy 
or mainstream thought. Of course we would recognise the immanent nonsense that 
results from the privileging of publication over scholarship. And this is not, of course, 
to suggest a totalising view of what constitutes an appropriate problematique or that 
every piece of work we do needs to be redolent with passion and revolution. But, we 
would maintain, it is the contribution to an appropriate problematique which provides 
the basis upon which evaluation of research (assuming, of course, that it is 
competently executed) should rest.  
Now what follows from this argument is the arresting suggestion that the privileging 
of `problem` over such things as publish-ability, citations, method, methodology, 
convenience or (what Wheen, 2004, p89 calls) the “tyranny of twaddle”, leads us to 
judge our research questions and how we answer them by the contribution they 
make to `the project’. This suggests that, actually, method is a very secondary 
concern. The point in social and environmental accounting research is that it is what 
you do (i.e. the selected problem/issue focus) that matters. How you do it (assuming 
you do it well) is, at least, relatively unimportant and possibly even largely irrelevant.4  
This is the essential contention we would like to explore further in this short essay. 
We have no intention of offering yet another re-evaluation of SEA, this has been 
                                                          
4
 We recognise immediately that to some of our colleagues, most typically from North America we suspect, 
this will sound like heresy. We discuss this relative emphasis on problem/method more fully throughout this 
essay. (However, the reader should note both authors come from a UK-based academic lineage). We suspect a 
significant influence on the North American approach to accounting research and a preference for 
modelling/quantitative methods lies in part in the structure of the North American PhD training of advanced 
courses (including methods) plus a thesis. This stands in contrast to the UK model, for example, of a 3-year 
thesis only approach in which methods are learned “on the job” and as appropriate to the problem being 
investigated. Indeed, in many UK-style PhD ‘programmes’, it is not unusual for a candidate to spend the first 
year finding “their problem” and defending a proposal.   
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more than adequately summarised most recently by Correa and Laine (2013). No, 
what we wish to discuss, in the round, are the dangers of any argument that one, 
single, approach to research is necessarily best (i.e. superior and therefore 
necessary, required, or permitted) and we wish to explore the contention that a much 
more profligate, perhaps even promiscuous, approach to research design offers a 
much more fruitful approach to project development. This is especially true in SEA. 
Consequently, this short essay seeks to revisit and rehearse these issues. The start 
(in Section 2) from the `which method is best` literature is unfortunate but it seems 
as if some of the self-evident truths in this area may not be so self-evident. Section 3 
is an attempt to synthesise a range of the issues that arise in what we see as `bad 
postivism’ - so much of which we believe comprises the hegemonic research agenda 
of the North American accounting academy. Section 4 returns to SEA and offers a 
brief plea for more interesting and important research – regardless of the method. 
2. Of Method and Madness 
… “The progress of science ….depends on an openness of world views which conflicts with the 
totalitarian pronouncements of many of [its] defenders. …World views …take a long time…. before 
they …’command recognition’ and what `commands recognition’ in one community, is often without 
interest and even damaging in another” (Feyerabend, 2011, p43) 
“Whoever undertakes to set himself up as a judge in the field of Truth and Knowledge is shipwrecked 
by the laughter of the gods.” (Einstein,1954, p30).
5
 
The question of the innate superiority of one method or of a family of methods, or of 
quantitative or qualitative methods, for example, continues to exercise a significant 
proportion of the accounting community – as elsewhere. For well over three decades 
(Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya, 1979; 1983; Tomkins and Groves, 1983; Chua, 1986; and, 
more recently, for example: Ahrens, 2008; Lukka, 2010; Modell, 2010; Lukka & 
Modell, 2010; Broadbent, 2012) accounting has been beset by `schools` to whom 
only one family of methods is acceptable (Baker, 2011)6. Such an attachment would, 
we might have thought, be self-evidently unsupportable as a point of view - but it is 
clearly not quite as self-evident as we might assume.  Whilst preference for method 
probably owes a great deal more to psychology and predisposition than to anything 
                                                          
5
 The origin of this quote is somewhat vague. While it certainly was used by Einstein, it has been attributed to 
Edmund Burke and Francis Bacon. 
6 Feyerabend (2011) makes the arresting observation that “Most …. philosophies started as attempts to put an 
end to the battle of the schools. They did not succeed. The attempts soon became schools themselves and 
joined the battle” (p9). For further examples of debates over methodology see Laudan (1996), Denzin (2008); 
Caldwell (2003); McCloskey (1998), Tashakorri & Teddlie (1998; 2010).   
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vaguely `rational’ (see, for example, Morgan, 1983; Choudhury, 1987; Berry and 
Otley, 2008, p234), it is manifestly reified on a daily basis in the journals and what 
they do or do not accept as knowledge or research7. This, in turn, becomes self-
fulfilling as faculty strive for tenure in solipsistic schools and as neophyte accounting 
researchers are too often trained in a manner that leads to limited and self-referential 
attitudes to truth and knowledge (Lee, 1997; Schwartz et al, 2005; Baker, 2011, 
p211). So perhaps we do have to (albeit briefly) revisit the `can any one method be 
best?’ schism. 
There is no need to rehearse in detail here the arguments8 that might bring us within 
striking distance of Feyerabend’s (typically mis-represented) “anything goes” 
conclusions (Feyerabend, 1975):  This task is elegantly achieved by Gareth Morgan 
in a series of short pieces that conclude Morgan’s edited collection  (Morgan, 1983; 
see p368 et seq.). Morgan concludes that we should “understand that… conflict 
[between different paradigms] may be rooted in different conceptions of scientific 
enquiry and scientific knowledge and that no single set of scientific standards can 
claim monopoly over decisions as to what counts as valid knowledge” (p393). (See 
also Tashakorri & Teddlie, 1998; 2010). 
Morgan’s synthesis can be briefly summarised around, what he calls, both 
ontological and epistemological uncertainties (p386) – a point so eloquently 
understood in Einstein’s opening quotation. There is patently no way of 
independently determining whether there actually is an independent reality `out 
there’ which our science seeks to uncover, describe and analyse. Equally, there is 
no independent way in which to demonstrate that there is no independent reality `out 
there’. In the end then it comes down to the privileging of criteria – the admissible 
predicates – by which one adjudges the theory or the knowledge: Thus `scientific’, 
`valid’, `replicable’, `relevant’, `practical’, `falsifiable’ and so on, join the realms of 
preference but which cannot themselves be justified in any independent or purely 
                                                          
7
 And, this is in all probability magnified by the proliferation of journal ranking lists (both academic and 
institutional) such as the Association of Business Schools, the Australian Business Deans list, the Financial 
Times 45, and an array of academic surveys of “which journal is best’ (Milne, 2001; Hussain, 2013). Further still 
there is a rapidly increasing number of Schools worldwide that require publication as a KPI for all their staff 
and, regardless of focus, arithmetic or practicability tend to focus on the “high ranking” journals as the only 
measure of performance worthy of consideration. Inevitably, emerging scholars pick up on this and learn to 
focus all their attention in just this way. Very sad - and appallingly counter-productive, (Parker et al, 1998).  
8
 Especially not in a journal like Critical Perspectives on Accounting where one can assume a relatively 
sophisticated level of methodological subtlety. 
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rational manner – that is they are (as Quine, 1976; suggests) “admissible predicates” 
and are pre-rational – before the argument, in essence.  All ontological belief is 
therefore always just that – a belief – and consequently any paradigm’s truth-claims, 
the persuasiveness of its knowledge, depends on a community of belief, pretty much 
as Kuhn and Lakatos argued (Kuhn, 1962/2012; Lakatos, 1970). This produces the 
elegant and useful inference that all ontology is conditional or, as Quine prefers, 
`tentative’: “in science all is tentative, all admits of revision” (Quine, 1976; p245).  
If all ontology must be tentative, uncertain and conditional, then it seems to follow, as 
Morgan shows, that all epistemology is equally tentative, uncertain and conditional: 
there are inevitable “limitations in our ways of knowing” (Morgan, p386). All 
knowledge is therefore, it would seem, conditional, tentative, (Laughlin, 1995) and it 
is through that embracing of doubt that our understandings will develop (Dewey, 
1930). Such a set of inferences seems sound, largely irrefutable (under current 
hegemonies of reason anyway) and greatly liberating9.   
There is, of course, a great deal more that can be said on this matter but this 
essential inference will be adequate for our purposes here:  the absence of any 
independent foundational principle ensures that all knowledge must be conditional 
which, in turn, withdraws warranty from any totalising claims in knowledge production 
and encourages the embracing and exchange of doubt. It ushers in, what we would 
choose to see as, John Keats’ epistemology of negative capability10. 
One further point needs making before we try and develop the essay further. It is 
probably unfortunate that most debates around methodology start from a critique of 
conventional science and/or positivism, (typically associated with quantitative 
methods and sometimes also referred to as nomothetic methodologies). The failings 
of conventional science are then typically deployed as the principal justification for 
the development of and attachment to interpretive or ideographic methodologies, 
(typically associated with qualitative methods). Too often, it seems to us, this implies 
that ideographic methods are the solution to the nomothetic problem (see, for 
example, Gill and Johnson, 1997). Perhaps the most valuable contribution to be 
                                                          
9
 Although we are grateful to Alan Richardson for reminding us that, of course, this does not give warranty to 
all research however poor nor does it remove the necessity to consider each and every research problem very 
carefully indeed.  
10
 This might be simply expressed as believing exclusively in X whilst accepting, without reservation, that not-X 
may be the case.  
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drawn from both Morgan and Feyeraband (in their very different ways) is to realise 
that neither is a `solution’ nor `answer’ to the other; that all methods have grave 
limitations and no franchise on truth11; and that both should be explicitly selected by 
reference to the problem being addressed; how apposite the method is to the 
illumination of the issue (typically research design) and the admissible predicates 
which the researcher brings to the issue (see, for example, Tashakorri & Teddlie, 
1998, 2010, and in accounting, Modell, 2010). This liberates us to discuss, not 
`which is the best method?’ but which methods best suit my explicit intentions here? 
and how might the problem be better understood by a pluralism of research 
approaches?  
“Interpretative social science certainly offers a brand of insight that positivism cannot 
achieve, but on the other hand, positivism can also generate forms of knowledge that 
elude the interpretative approach” Morgan, (1983, p397) 
The liberation that such an analysis brings is not just the recognition that the 
disenfranchising of forms of knowledge is a predominantly un-supportable activity 
but that it also has the effect of encouraging a much more thoughtful and inclusive 
approach to the questions that can and should be addressed: no longer are 
questions largely determined by the methods through which they might be answered, 
the data which is easily available and the `normal science’ by which they are framed 
and judged (Chua, 1986; Richardson, this issue).  
Many areas of accounting already recognise this (see the earlier references to 
management accounting, for example) and one will find quantitative methods 
informing qualitative speculations – and, of course, vice versa. For instance the 
quantitative understandings of why investors buy certain shares have, rather more 
recently, been greatly enhanced by the use of qualitative methods and actually 
asking said investors (see, for example, Holland, 1998). Frequently (typically 
exploratory) fieldwork can expose suggestions to which quantitative methods can 
provide wider context or for which quantitative techniques may be used to explore 
the likely wider applicability of findings (one example might be gender and work 
                                                          
11
 Indeed, Morgan challenges qualitative researchers to develop means by which to introduce the same levels 
of scepticism in their methods as can be articulated in a thoughtfully applied positivism. (Morgan, 1982, p384) 
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experience, and income levels).12 Often hypotheses developed using one set of 
methods can be so usefully explored using others (see, for example, Murray et al., 
2006). Methods can so easily be used symbiotically to develop elements of 
problems13. 
We know that such a suggestion is frequently eschewed by both quantitative and 
qualitative researchers, but it is probably worthwhile to re-visit some of the key points 
underlying such a view14. Putting aside our anxieties for a moment there seems little 
question that regularities occur both in nature and, to a perhaps lesser degree, in 
human society. It is regularities which form the bedrock for the quantitative 
researcher – and we want to try and distinguish between, on the one hand, the 
search for and identification and analysis of regularities and, on the other, all the 
paraphernalia of functionalism, positivism and any claims to certainty/infallibility. The 
two are usefully distinct.  
That is, quantitative methods are ideal for seeking out, identifying and exploring 
regularities in phenomena. Whether it be (for instance) rainfall and plant life; ambient 
temperature and species; chemical composition and flexibility or strength; we all find 
it useful to rely upon many of the regularities of natural science and engineering. In 
the social world such regularities can also be thought to exist. This is probably 
subject to rather more challenge than in the case of natural science including 
challenge over the processes and assumptions involved. Nevertheless: diet and 
height; parents’ income and opportunity; humanity and environmental degradation; 
human-produced emissions and climate change; publication output and self-
importance; accounting training and tedium; are just some of the many examples 
with which society regularly engages and upon which we, to an extent at least, rely. 
And relying upon that only requires that we accept a sort of conditional ontology – 
that whether through self-delusion or a belief – an article of faith - in a factual reality, 
our current understanding of human existence factors in and embraces the 
possibility of such regularities.  
                                                          
12
 Bryman and Bell (2011) provide a particularly useful text on business research methods that embraces the 
notion of mixed methods research design and which avoids the rather restrictive positivist/quantitative, 
interpretivist/qualitative divide. See also Tashakorri & Teddlie (1998, 2010). 
13
 This is not to gainsay the dangers of incommensurability in evidence from different methods. Very broadly, 
we might suggest that triangulation of different evidences from different methods commends a more organic 
and tentative notion of “knowing” to us when evaluating states of nature.   
14
 These points that may seem fairly self-evident but are, perhaps surprisingly, not widely accepted. Even the 
more determinedly qualitative research community often behave as if statistics are the work of the devil. 
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Once this simple idea is accepted then we are in position to accept that the 
employment of both quantitative and qualitative methods in research can be an 
informative act but that the care with which the methods are applied and the critical 
reflection on the restrictions, assumptions and limitations remains essential. Indeed, 
as Latour effectively suggests with respect to natural science more widely (Latour, 
2004), we must take these methods, their collated data and their associated 
processes most seriously – certainly more seriously that many positivists seem to 
take their `science` (Patten, 2002) and, by extension, perhaps more seriously than 
many qualitative researchers take their problems.  
“[Thus can we] emphasize the importance of critical reflection as a basis for action, to 
help researchers orient their activities in a way that attempts to take full view of the 
relations within which such action is set, the consequences of that action, and of 
alternative actions. Such a perspective would reorient the role of the researcher from that 
of a technical functionary pursuing a prespecified form of knowledge (as a foundational 
view of knowledge tends to encourage), and place responsibility for the conduct and 
consequences of research directly with the researcher. Each researcher would carry an 
obligation to reflect on the nature of his or her activity as a means of choosing an 
appropriate path of action” (Morgan p374). 
 
Which brings us nicely to the issue at hand for this paper. Social (and environmental 
and sustainability) accounting, on the face of it at least, has long professed a 
concern with problem over method and consequently has been active in the 
embracing of research which employs all forms of methods (Patten, 2002). Although 
this self-regard may be unfounded (see, for example, Spence et al., 2010; Owen, 
2008b), there is a principle here that the problem is what is (or should be) driving the 
enquiry.15  
3. Doing badly, that which shouldn’t be done at all16 
The theories we construct, the hypotheses we test and the beliefs we have are all shaped by our 
systems of metrics. Social scientists often blithely use easily accessible numbers, like GDP, as a 
basis of their empirical models, without enquiring sufficiently into the limitations and biases in the 
metrics. Flawed or biased statistics can lead us to make incorrect inferences. (Stiglitz et al., Mis-
measuring Our Lives, 2010, p.xix) 
                                                          
15
 This is, of course, entirely consistent with a pragmatic approach to research methodology, mixed methods 
design and pluralism. Which method(s) is selected depends on the problem at hand, and which is likely to 
deliver the outcomes that work, while understanding fully that what works is likely to be contingent and 
temporary. This problem choice/focus, call for constant experimentation, and abandonment of the fact-value 
distinction also provides the foundation to environmental pragmatism which eschews the theoretical and 
idealistic debate over the instrumental/intrinsic value of the environment in favour of working on concrete 
issues (see, for example, Norton 1996; Parker, 1996; Weston, 1985). 
16
 This heading is a deliberate adaptation of the widely quoted critique “doing efficiently that which shouldn’t 
be done at all” which is variously attributed to Tony Lowe, Peter Drucker, Kenneth Boulding and Paul Ehrlich. 
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Our purpose here is not to provide a detailed critique of Patten’s paper17 but rather to 
use the paper to prompt a number of comments about the role of quantitative 
methods in social and environmental accounting research; the myopic notion of what 
quantitative research becomes when it is determined by 4 or 5 solipsistic journals on 
a single continent and try to expose what is (in effect) `bad positivism` (Patten, 
2002). It probably advances all our causes if we can move beyond thoughtless 
dismissal of work for its failure to meet some arbitrary and precious criteria and start 
to concentrate rather on a more considered and explicit examination of how work 
fails to meet our carefully identified criteria18 and, more importantly, how it fails to 
meet its own explicit (or more usually implicit) criteria.19   
It behoves us to recognise that whilst our own personal political orientations direct 
our preferences towards papers which exhibit concerns about: ecological 
desecration; social inequality; or the crass oppression of modern financial capitalism 
and its organs; few do so and that is not, necessarily, an intrinsic failing of 
quantitative research papers. The solipsistic journals demonstrate no concern at all 
for such global manifestations and consequently have nothing to say, in our 
judgement, on matters pertaining to the social accounting project. That is, if one 
wanted to know about social, environmental or sustainability issues the approach 
taken in the solipsistic journals would never cross your mind. This is not a rejection 
of quantitative methods but, rather, of the whole mindset typically conveyed in the 4-
5 (mainly) US journals. Consequently, the solipsistic journals no longer speak to us: 
that is not a failure in and of itself. The failure within these journals lies in two major 
places. First, authors fail to justify (or even recognise that they need to justify) how 
and why they are able to ignore the substantial context of all current accounting (and 
the context that generates such absences of accounting). Secondly, as is very well 
known, these journals and their acolytes are intent upon imposing a totalising 
approach to research and knowledge which is entirely unjustifiable – and bizarrely 
still manages to hang on to the power to do so.20 It is not what is done that demands 
                                                          
17
 We outlined in footnote 2 how we ended up in this position regarding responding to Den’s paper. 
18
 Our selection of the privileging of problem and project may, equally, be a little precious but at least (we 
hope) we have made it explicit and our reasons for doing so.  
19
 For more detail on “bad science” in accounting, see Murray Lindsay’s work (see, for example, Lindsay 1995; 
1997; Lindsay & Ehrenberg, 1993; Hubbard & Lindsay 2013a; 2013b). 
20
 Why anybody still gives them warranty and doesn’t just ignore them is largely a mystery to us, although we 
agree with the work of Tom Lee and Paul Williams who so eloquently illustrate how systems of academic 
power and elitism are maintained and reproduced.  
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these responses it is that they are oppressive and come to dominate others to the 
point where they become the norm. That is outrageous.  
These are points with which Patten (this issue) is in complete agreement. 
Consequently, in what follows we are not seeking to dismiss positivism or to say that 
any particular kind of work should not take place. (We might believe it politically but 
we cannot substantiate it intellectually). What we are trying to do is ask those whose 
gaze rarely stretches beyond the journals of solipsism, to try to recognise the glaring 
but understandable limitations of their work. In doing so they would thereby 
recognise that no method can be justified as ‘superior’ and, certainly, no method can 
be so dominating as to be legitimately totalising. 
We would want to emphasise that we certainly do not want Den Patten to stop doing 
sums and start doing stories instead.21 The arguments Patten puts are substantial, 
the work he does is important and the world would be a worse place without it. One 
of the genuine potential elegances of positivist work is the harmony it can bring to 
the careful deduction of insightful hypotheses from a carefully constructed (and 
justifiable) thesis. Too often, it seems to us, neither the theory nor the deduction is 
treated as seriously as it needs to be and, therefore, relatively tedious hypotheses 
are plucked from the air supported by some fairly facile speculations. Such is the 
case in so much of the solipsist work in accounting and it is this we would like to 
briefly consider.  
If we briefly imagine the stages in a (artificially linear) research process it might help 
us to throw into relief some of the buried assumptions that seem to be inevitable in 
research. Some of these buried assumptions are legion in the solipsist journals and 
some of which are even occasionally present in Patten (this issue). 
Worldview: It seems a truism that one’s worldview, political and spiritual allegiances, 
and levels of perspective, frame, determine and motivate one’s work. One crucial 
contribution of the critical project (however we decide to define `critical’) has been to 
help scholars learn to expose the implicit contours of their worldviews. Rarely is this 
a completed project it seems: as we come to make explicit our assumptions and 
                                                          
21
 It is important to note that quantitative research is bound up in its own genre with a representative 
language, narrative and rhetoric – one needs a certain styled language to sell quantitative research as 
“scientific” (McCloskey, 1994; 1998) And this in part, at least, is why we suspect so much abject nonsense 
manages to break through the peer review process and become published – form it seems can trump 
substance.  
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beliefs about power, goodness, the planet and the role of humanity, for example, so 
we can begin to understand differences (Tinker et al, 1991; Tinker and Gray, 2003) . 
Our contention would be that even Den’s work exhibits a conservatism that probably 
would not embrace a deep ecology or see a world without financial markets, 
corporations, etc... as desideratum. But once this is articulated and made explicit we 
can debate the matter, acknowledge it as an underlying assumption and proceed in 
explicit recognition of it as a conditionality in our work. Indeed, we are reminded 
again that it is more often the character and motivation, training and awareness of 
the researcher which is really at issue – not rigour or method. 
But training is crucial: a neophyte trained exclusively in a single literature and a 
single narrow method is, by definition, going to find it much harder to recognise that 
narrowness – framing is all. And consequently such a new scholar is so much less 
likely to be aware that other forms of scholarship are possible, let alone desirable. 
The trainers have much responsibility to bear here. Equally, having discovered and 
developed a particular capacity it is a relatively rare scholar who will abandon that 
focus and re-tool.22 It is not of pluralism per se that we speak, therefore, in the sense 
of individuals pursuing multiple research questions with multiple research methods, 
(although some might do so), but of the necessity of a wider recognition that this is 
(and should be) the wider purpose of the research community at large, and that calls 
for a wider perception, understanding and tolerance of all individuals’ research 
preferences.  
Purpose of Scholarship: It is in this spirit that Patten (this issue) is framed. A 
dominant motivation to seek to enlighten the unenlightened and to challenge 
hegemonic explanations and perceptions in the language of those very solipsists is 
highly admirable. To expose the internal absurdities of work is a very valuable act 
but the solipsist journals seem profoundly resistant to such enlightenment – as we 
can attest to personally (see also Tinker and Puxty, 1995).23 Patten’s decision is a 
                                                          
22
 There are many who have done this, Jesse Dillard is one such character who has very successfully done this 
and who has a passing acquaintance with and affection for the social accounting project(s). There are other 
brave and admirable souls. Nonetheless, we are also aware of senior scholars (from various perspectives) who 
perceive their beliefs and methods as superior, and whose purpose is to convert and recruit acolytes to 
“outbreed” the “enemy”. 
23
 Ruth Hines tells of a similar story in her journey to publication in TAR. But the resistance doesn’t just come in 
the form of having work from alternative perspectives rejected from the mainstream journals because it is 
seen as little better than “opinion” or a nice “after dinner talk”. It also comes in having intolerant editors of 
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political one that, broadly, reflects a reformist agenda to which we both subscribed 
for a substantial part of our careers – our view now being that a 40+ year experiment 
to reform capitalism is long enough to reject the more optimistic of hypotheses. This 
does not invalidate a reformist motivation per se: rather it demands of us that such 
motivations are explored and exposed (Tinker et al, 1991).   
It is these matters of politics, world views, training and so on which, to a degree at 
least, influence how a project is framed and established by the researcher.   
This concern is not one of quantitative versus qualitative methods: outside the 
solipsistic journals there are many, many examples of work crossing the divide whilst 
embracing similar research motivations (as Patten, indeed, suggests). So our focus 
here is only partly on quantitative methods themselves and rather more on how such 
methods are understood (sic) and manifest in the solipsistic journals. After all, 
“science” is pretty crucial to most notions of sustainability: – the WWF reports, the 
GEO reports, the UN Millennium Declaration, Limits to Growth, and the IPCC reports 
are all scientific and positivist based analyses. Likewise, measures of inequality, 
disease, health statistics, poverty, etc…are all grounded in quantitative analyses - as 
Richardson (this issue) argues.   
 
Framing of the Scholarship: At least part of this is recognising that different sorts of 
questions appeal to different sorts of minds and are best addressed through different 
sorts of methods. We have to say that we resent the notion that econometrics 
presumes to explain why we do (or do not) have children in our relationships and we 
would be intellectually underwhelmed by ethnographies of whether or not climate 
change and species extinction was taking place. But while we applaud papers such 
as Patten (this issue) joining prior work by (amongst many others) Cho and Patten 
(2013) and Coupland (2006) in explicit recognition of the need to challenge 
“mainstream accounting literature’s myopic view” about CSR, there remains, too 
often, an implicit framing and theorising which comprises only corporations and their 
investors in a search for yet greater wealth. Indeed, we have never ceased to be 
both amazed and incensed that tax-payer funded scholars could spend so much of 
their time engaged in research which potentially benefits organisations and their 
investors already worth thousands of billions of dollars. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
mainstream journals “overrule” critical and dissenting voices raising legitimate questions and concerns about 
the (critical) limitations to quantitative research papers during the review process.  
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Whilst the solution is far from clear, there remains the distinct danger that 
challenging work within the paradigm, using all its own paraphernalia, merely helps 
reify the myopia of investors, financial markets and neo-liberalism. Yet to fail to 
engage solipsist econometricians in their own terms risks being marginalized by 
senior practitioners as “philosophic” or even metaphysical – something of a pre-
dinner appetizer before getting down to the real business of the “scientific” main 
course. And newcomers may simply not understand the nature of any challenge to 
such a view. Indeed, an anecdote illustrates this perfectly. Listening to a 
presentation, from an outstanding new scholar, of an exquisitely elegant analysis of 
how a western investor might enhance their wealth and the returns of their share 
portfolio by diversifying into emerging markets, one was struck by the thought that 
such talent could be deployed in analysing the negative wealth impacts on the 
emerging market and its society using precisely the same techniques –simply asking 
the question the other way around.  No matter how the new scholar was addressed, 
they had no notion of what was meant, why it was interesting or why anybody might 
consider the problem. There is something structural in our education (most widely) 
that is constraining our discourse here.  
Theory and Prior Literature: It should be obvious by now, that one of the problems 
that concern us here derives from a narrow range of accounting journals that are 
self-referential, exclusive and oddly powerful. Authors in these journals tend to 
ignore work in all other accounting journals and the evidence they offer.24 This is not 
only poor scholarship but bad manners as well. It is simply rude. This is especially 
bewildering in the field of SEA where the vast substance of research and scholarship 
in the field lies outside the solipsist journals – with the result that those journals have, 
as we have said, nothing to say to the social accounting project(s).  
                                                          
24
 This is, of course, an exaggeration, but it is not an outrageously great one. Anecdotally, one of us is 
reminded of a North American colleague who honestly admitted she only used four accounting journals for her 
work, and had not even heard of Accounting, Organizations & Society. She is not an extreme example. One 
only needs to purview articles in so-called top accounting journals to understand their exclusivity. Moreover, 
as Milne (2001) documents, the inter-journal citation rates for The Accounting Review, the Journal of 
Accounting Research, the Journal of Accounting and Economics, and Accounting, Organization & Society is 
outrageously high. Based on ten years of publications in those journals (1990-1999), Milne (2001) shows they 
cite each other  82%, 80%, 90% and 78% for US-based authors, and 87%, 81%, 78% and 75% for non-US-based 
authors respectively. A similar level of “deference” to the so-called “top-4” was observed for Contemporary 
Accounting Research at 75%.  Yet for the bulk of 22 other peer-reviewed accounting journals, citation rates to 
those four journals were lower: 60-70% for US-based authors and often less than 50% for non-US-based 
authors.  One typically finds the greatest levels of “eclecticism” outside the four journals, and especially so if 
the authors reside outside North America. All of this, of course, is entirely consistent with Lee’s and Williams’ 
charge of elitism.  
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Similarly, as Richardson (this issue) shows, this myopia results in a narrow range of 
theory being considered as either sources of hypotheses or as sources of 
explanation for phenomena. In essence, theory, such as it is, considers the pursuit 
by the rich and powerful of greater richness and power an apposite focus and one 
which is adequately articulated by a direct, functional almost robotic relationship 
between information and decision making. The dominance of information economics 
is simply astonishing, and testimony to the complete absence of imagination in a 
field so obviously filled with moral, political and social as well as economic 
complexity. One is led to speculate whether this is the best we can do for theory – 
even assuming we think that investors’ wealth is a matter worthy of our attention. 
Furthermore, we are led to wonder how (and if) that focus can be justified beyond a 
somewhat primitive neo-liberalism (Freidman, 1962; Jacobsen, 1991). We make 
these points because it seems to us that, as a community, we might make a better 
job of researching our world if we were required to more carefully examine our 
worldviews, their justifications and their compatibility with the meso-theory employed 
implicitly in our work.  
Perhaps most importantly in this respect of theory, how do we move from patterns of 
association to claims about reasons and motivations and intentions without at least 
gathering some additional evidence? That is, the `as if’ (instrumentalist) justifications 
for agency theory and its analogues provide us with a disturbingly bankrupt picture of 
humanity and a very grey perspective on what is happening in the world. There is a 
habitual, it seems, drawing (assuming) of intentions/motivations without any 
additional augmenting evidence. Surely we can do better than that? Many of the 
studies on which such theorising and speculation rests were undertaken 20 or more 
years ago, and were perhaps novel at the time, yet we do need to encourage the 
solipsist journals to move on. Maybe this is Patten’s project in brief.  
Data: If there is one major issue that we believe neither Patten (this issue) nor 
Roberts and Wallace (this issue) address sufficiently it is the matter of data 
availability, or perhaps more correctly the unavailability of appropriate data, and what 
to do about it. Indeed we could question whether research questions and methods 
are driven only by the orthodoxy of the journals: it seems to us they are just as much 
a function of easily accessible data. Three immediate problems present themselves. 
First, as Richardson (this issue) notes, a raft of assumptions and preferences are 
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built into these databases and that underlying basis is almost never explored. (The 
implausibility of the proxies that then result, we explore below). Secondly, and more 
potently, we would argue, many of the databases are generated by commercial and 
financial interest: only the factors that such interests are willing to pursue are 
manifest. Or, in other cases, databases were generated for purposes potentially 
quite at odds to which researchers put them, or in which researchers need to 
undertake quite unbelievable and utterly meaningless data gymnastics to force the 
data into a usable form.25  
We would love to have a database of the ecological footprints of organisations or 
data on the ratio of highest to lowest paid employee or a database on the use of 
sweatshop labour in the supply chain or a database of levels of redundancies by 
organisation etc. These do not currently exist and so nobody wanting to get 
published in the solipsist journals in the North American accounting community can 
study them. The worst mistake a positivist can make, we believe, is to decide (or 
assume) that only questions for which data already exists can be worthy of study.26 
The next worst mistake is to force available data intended for other purposes into a 
format for use for which it was never intended without so much as a by your leave.  
Thirdly, it is essential that we study absence; if we do not then the research agenda 
is largely set by companies, accountants, and financial markets. And of course, by its 
very reliance on regression based inter-firm analyses, the research is firm-centric. 
Virtually everything is quantitatively reduced to the level of the organization (and 
most particularly, that of the corporation).   
Research Question: All of this brings us to an appreciation that the research question 
in the solipsist journals does not really stand a chance of being terribly interesting - 
                                                          
25
 A clear example here is the use of the US Toxic Release Inventory - a public data base with disaggregated 
chemical emissions data on specific chemicals at community and facility levels.  Following the Love Canal 
disaster of the 1970s, its intent is to serve the “community’s right to know” and provide local community 
members with details of imminent threats to their health from spills or discharges. Yet, such data is regularly 
“re-aggregated” across multiple facilities and multiple chemicals (often meaninglessly so we would argue from 
a scientific point of view) into global metrics for the unintended purposes of firm-level comparisons in 
econometric models. At no time is a scientific defence provided for such data manipulations, nor are the 
potential scientific limitations of such actions ever raised. We can only but imagine toxicologists falling about 
laughing at such potentially absurd behaviour, perhaps in the same way we would if they started adding loans 
to revenue or deducting depreciation from cash.         
26
 Again, we wonder to what extent the expediency of available database driven research is contingent upon 
the “short-cycle” US-based PhD programme where perhaps as little as 12-18 months is available to complete 
the dissertation. This is perhaps then compounded by needs to publish in top journals and make tenure, where 
the new scholar publishes from their thesis, and then “learns” this is the way it works, further reinforcing the 
approach in their continuing career and the expectations they pass on to their own thesis students. 
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or not interesting outside a really narrow understanding of normal science. This does 
not, in any sense, mean that those using quantitative methods cannot ask and 
answer interesting questions in interesting ways which advance the public interest, 
social accounting and/or critical understandings. Patten, Roberts and others are not 
alone in providing really outstanding insights. It is rather that if anybody obsessively 
focuses on reading and trying to get published in the solipsist journals, their 
questions must be neo-liberal, data-driven, corporation and investor focused and (as 
we see shortly) amenable to (to quote Roberts and Wallace, this issue) the latest 
econometric techniques. Consequently, almost by definition, no question that 
involves `social responsibility’, or `social disclosure’ or even `sustainababble’ 
(Engelman, 2013) is likely to have any substantial contribution to make to social 
responsibility, social disclosure or sustainability. The questions must, almost without 
exception, speak to investors’ wealth, the cost of capital, risk to finance and so on. 
Who cares: when children are starving or dying of thirst? Or that the human 
population, ably abetted by corporate and investor greed, overshot the Earth’s 2014 
annual bio-capacity by the month of August. 
So the solipsistic research question and the topic defined as `interesting’ must, by 
definition, be of almost no interest to most of humanity (except insofar as these 
activities are principal causes of the global problems) and thus of little or no interest 
to the social accounting project(s). Topic interest must, surely, at some level or other, 
be subject to some, however flexible, `public interest’ test?  
Method and the Structure of the Research Question: It is not just the research 
question that must concern us here but the way in which the question itself is asked 
and, most especially, the whole issue of definitions, proxies and construct validity 
which are buried within the question. It is an area much under-examined in the whole 
field of SEA – not just the more positivistic work. This is a major factor (one we can 
only touch upon here) and another one to which, we would suggest, Patten (this 
issue) and Roberts and Wallace (this issue) give insufficient attention (at least for our 
preference). These comments may sound harsh, but if we are going to seriously 
debate the merit of quantitative methods, then data authenticity and data (construct) 
validity seem fundamentally crucial. To do otherwise is to risk being criticized for 
garbage-in-garbage-out. If there was one criticism that uniquely identifies `bad` 
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positivism it must be the flaccid construction of proxies; the unexamined 
assumptions of correspondence between concepts and constructs.  
Perhaps the first plea is that terms like  “CSR”, “SEA”, “environmental performance” 
and “social performance” and so on should all be (at a minimum) in quotations as 
they are both highly contestable (floating signifiers if you prefer) and they have 
attached meanings quite different to the implications of the way in which they are 
measured. They are often VERY bad proxies for things which often turn out to be 
tautologies (Gray, 2006). For example, some notion like the establishment of an 
“environmental management system” (EMA) is an important and interesting concept. 
Yet, it tells one nothing necessarily about an organization’s interaction with the 
natural environment. Nor does it say anything necessarily about a firm’s 
“environmental performance” (more on this below). Measured as a binary indicator 
(yes or no), EMS tells you whether a firm has (or claims to have) one or not: no 
more, no less. Socially constructed as a “variable” what does a measure of EMS tell 
you? What does it say about the firms’ behaviours purporting to be “environmental 
management”? And what does it say about the researchers’ constructions? There is 
no standardized definition of EMS; there is no standardized measure. And there is 
no necessary relationship between either the definition/concept, or the measure, or 
any ‘real’ actions or decisions the firm may be undertaking in its name. Quantitative 
researchers in SEA are not simply making observations of well-defined natural 
phenomena  - as we typically assume do chemists and physicists. And neither are 
they engaged with well-established and standardized social phenomena like 
economic and accounting numbers. They are actively engaged in socially 
constructing highly ambiguous concepts and measures – too often, we believe, 
without careful and cautious deliberations. While it might sound harsh, ‘plug and 
play’ seems an apt description for much of what often passes. Too little effort we 
believe is spent on substantively establishing a great many so-called social and 
environmental metrics plugged into quantitative analyses. As Stiglitz et al (2010, 
p.xxv) so amusingly suggest:   
“There is no single indicator that can capture something as complex as our society. 
Trying to capture what is going on by using a set of numbers that is too small can be 
grossly misleading. We might want to know how fast we are driving...and how far we can 
go before we run out of gasoline, but a single metric, say by adding the two numbers 
would tell us nothing about either question”.  
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Equally, for example, “quality” of reporting is a complex notion but it actually doesn’t 
really need measuring in most cases of voluntary social and environmental 
disclosure. And this is because it is so clearly woeful by any of the standards that 
accounting would apply to its own variables. It is only obliquely approximated by a 
GRI proxy – itself a woeful approximation of anything related to accountability or 
sustainability (Buhr et al, 2014; Moneva et al. 2006; Milne and Gray, 2013).  
So what should we make of notions like “corporate environmental performance”, 
“social responsibility performance” or “sustainability performance”? These are terms 
frequently bandied around by quantitative SEA researchers, and indeed a great 
many other empirical researchers (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Clarkson et al., 2011; Dixon-
Fowler et al., 2013) but are they meaningful concepts and could they provide a basis 
for a variable that could be plausibly measured that stands for what it purports to be? 
Would such concepts and measures stand up in a court of law as admissible 
evidence? Would our colleagues in science fall about laughing at such constructions 
and measures as little short of fantasy?  To William James (1909/1979, pp. 135-
136), we suspect, a great many are “vicious abstractions” – a process he believed to 
be one of “the great original sins of the rationalistic mind.”   
... We conceive a concrete situation by singling out some salient or important feature in 
it, ... then, instead of adding to its previous characters all the positive consequences 
which the new way of conceiving it may bring, we [reduce] the originally rich 
phenomenon to the naked suggestions of that name abstractly taken, treating it as a 
case of “nothing but” that concept, and acting as if all the other characters from out of 
which the concept is abstracted were expunged. Abstraction, functioning in this way, 
becomes a means of arrest far more than a means of advance in thought... 
 
In a theatre actors perform actions to an audience, and seek to please or amuse. In 
sport, actors perform actions by competing against other actors, or against some 
defined standard of comparison (e.g. time). In these instances, the actors, the 
actions, and the cause and effect of the actions are relatively clearly defined and 
understood – one can attribute the actions to the actors as performance. In financial 
terms, we think of performance in terms of firm level actors (defined by legal or other 
(transaction) boundaries) and actions considered directly traceable or attributable to 
that entity, over a specified period of time, against benchmarks like breakeven, 
previous periods, future targets, or some other comparator, and for the purposes of 
inter-firm or inter-temporal comparisons, measured in standardized ways (i.e. ROA). 
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Yet, as we know, measurement, and cause and effect knowledge of actions, and the 
cause and effect of those actions in financial terms, are far less clear.  
With matters of a firm’s social and environmental behaviours and effects, we 
suggest, it is several orders of magnitude murkier still. Is it even possible to “bound” 
a single corporation’s social performance? How would one separate one 
corporations’ environmental performance from another’s? How would one separate it 
from other natural processes that affect the environment? Do SEA quantitative 
researchers even consider changes in the physical state of an organization’s 
“natural” environment (even if we could agree on what bounds it) as part of that 
organization’s environmental performance? It is when one starts to reflect on matters 
such as these that you realize that the social constructions by SEA researchers of 
concepts like “sustainability performance” are likely meaningless nonsense. 
Meaningless nonsense in the sense that they bear no necessary relationship to 
positive or negative changes in the physical (and/or social) environment that can be 
traced unambiguously to the actions of particular organizational actors over a given 
period of time, and against scientifically acceptable sets of rigorous measures or 
standards. Yet SEA researchers, for example, seem absurdly able to “proxy” firms’ 
“sustainability performance” by membership or otherwise of the Dow Jones 
Sustainability (sic) Index.  
We don’t doubt events like the BP Horizon oil spill detrimentally screwed the physical 
(and social) environment of the Gulf of Mexico, and that some actions and effects will 
be attributable to BP as an organization – others might well be argued to be “pre-
existing factors” attributable to others, or to “natural” effects. In many other instances 
(for example, the responsibility for and the effects of non-point source pollution) it will 
be far less clear. What we seriously doubt, however, is that it is possible to 
meaningfully measure the effects of the BP spill in a way that permits them to be 
aggregated to the other effects of BP’s actions elsewhere, and in a way that permits 
them to be sensibly compared to the actions and the social and environmental 
effects of other organizations in a simple comparative regression analysis. And, it is 
not as if this insight is new, or shouldn’t have been taken on board by SEA 
researchers. Dierkes and Preston’s (1977, p6, p14-15) seminal paper on corporate 
reporting for the physical environment couldn’t be clearer: 
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The nature and scope of environmental impacts varies so greatly among firms and types 
of economic activity that the search for a single set of analytical categories, 
measurement techniques, and decision-criteria for corporate social accounting reporting 
in this area seems almost certain to be fruitless. 
 
They went on to state their proposed accounting framework: 
…confines itself to reporting companies’ commitments (inputs)…as well as performance 
data (outputs) which includes for example, the levels of pollutant emissions and changes 
in these levels. Secondary external effects - for example, the consequences of pollution 
on the health of the surrounding community or the general ecological system - are 
excluded. Such effects, although of great importance, can only be dealt with seriously in 
extensive and sharply focused studies which, due to the reasons previously mentioned, 
cannot be integrated into a continuous and regular reporting system. 
The framework outlined here does not suggest the use of a unique performance 
measurement unit - and certainly not a monetary measurement unit - for all areas of 
environmental impact. On the contrary, it uses a wide variety of measures, appropriately 
developed for the various specific impact areas. This usage reflects the position stated 
earlier, that we see no way at present, nor for the foreseeable future, to define a common 
denominator integrating the diverse measurements that are available and appropriate for 
the various environmental impacts to be covered…. the integration of precise data into 
artificial indexes of “social welfare” or arbitrary monetary valuations hides, rather than 
provides, information, and thus serves as a barrier to understanding and decision 
making. 
In other words, the physical environmental context of most organizations - and their 
interactions with it - are so complex as to be beyond simple reductive measures that 
might provide meaningful inter-firm comparisons. 
In correspondence for this paper an interesting question arose: what should a 
quantitative researcher do if the only proxy is a poor one? If there is no “good” proxy 
for (say) CSR performance available right now, then should quantitative researchers 
not examine problems related to CSR performance at all yet? This is a big question 
which, sadly, is rarely considered and unfortunately is one we can only touch upon 
but there are several dimensions to it.  
First, as we have said, CSR is at best a floating signifier and there is really no way 
that `CSR performance’ can be defined, let alone proxied, without some very careful 
definitional analysis. Second, there is an interesting implication that (often without 
realising it), a researcher may come to believe that they must have proxies. But we 
only need proxies (at least in this sense) if we are using quantitative methods, not 
otherwise. Third, and the most important of all, the implication seems to be that one 
must have proxies for which there is already conveniently available computer-
readable data, and which must provide “comparable” inter-firm quantitative metrics. 
Invariably, then, rather than embrace the warnings of James (1907), Dierkes & 
Preston (1977), and Stiglitz et al (2010), quantitative SEA researchers, to our way of 
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thinking, too often fall back on existing simple, ill-fitting and inappropriate data 
sources, and excuse their use on the basis that they are a “proxy”, or the only 
available proxy, and more often than not some other quantitative researcher has 
used them before. As if previous sloppy behavior justifies yet more sloppy behaviour.  
The same behavior seems to justify the use of existing data sources with little critical 
probing and reflection. Take, for example, the KLD “environmental performance” 
ratings data – popularly used. Not only do these data sets confine themselves to the 
first order firm activities which Dierkes & Preston (1977) indicate above, and so are 
essentially measures of “firm performance” (e.g., fines, emissions, etc..) rather than 
“environmental performance” (e.g. measures of physical environmental damage), the 
source of the data is the firm itself, not an independent party. In this context, then, 
researchers using KLD data to compare “environmental performance” with say 
“environmental disclosures” seem blissfully unaware they are largely comparing two 
socially constructed metrics of reported firm environmental behaviours from a single 
source – the firm. As a test of “authenticity” in the corporate reporting of firm level 
“environmental” behaviours to two audiences (i.e. KLD and the public) this is likely a 
valid argument. As a claim to be assessing “actual” environmental performance with 
“reported” environmental disclosure, it is clearly circular nonsense. Indeed, given the 
complexities to which Dierkes and Preston (1977) so eloquently allude, surely it is 
nonsense to believe anybody would know or could claim to assess without significant 
uncertainly what the “actual” environmental performance of any large firm could be.27 
Indeed, all claims to know the actual environmental performance of an organization 
are just that, claims, more or less informed and almost certainly incomplete. One is 
reminded here of the fable of the 5 blind men and the elephant – all know it a little 
but none know what each know, and none know it all. Are we not simply reduced to 
making statistical comparisons of partial (and so meaningless) speculations? North 
American accounting-style quantitative methods for the solipsist journals, it seems to 
                                                          
27
 One only needs to reflect for the slightest moment on the sheer size and complex reach of many 
multinationals to understand that neither they nor anybody else can know the physical environmental effects 
of their behaviours let alone measure them. Perrow (1984) suggests many modern organizations and systems 
are so large and complex that one should expect “normal accidents” – a form of systemic failure from a lack of 
sufficient knowledge and inability to maintain control. In a similar way, with large modern organisations 
exceeding 250 billion dollars in assets and annual turnover – often in excess of many countries’ economies, it is 
not hard to appreciate their operations have complex interactions with the physical environment that are 
beyond understanding and measurement.    
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us, allows the “requirements” of the method to dictate how a question is structured, 
which in turn creates a voracious appetite for data – and any data, it seems, will do.  
If one insists that only large sample econometrics are acceptable, then your 
questions are reduced to those that feature in a few journals, can be addressed 
using easily accessible computer readable databases and inevitably force you to 
employ bad (but easily accessible) proxies. Both the left and the right hand of your 
equations (as Richardson, this issue, argues) are reduced to very few variables 
indeed. It is in this context that Patten’s arguments are at their most powerful but 
also (potentially) at their most limited.  
Inevitably, conversations, training and evaluation focus more and more on the actual 
techniques and less and less on the thinking that goes into their application. We 
personally find this a little odd: when doing quantitative work we would consult a 
statistician or an econometrician; in the same way we consult philosophers when 
exploring philosophy, for example; and in the same way as if we wanted to publish in 
Portuguese we would consult a Portuguese speaker.  We see our expertise as that 
of academic accountants, not econometricians or linguists. But the solipsist journals 
seem to be intent on arguing that only econometricians and statisticians can have 
anything to say about social life. That is patent nonsense. Herbert Simon (1960) calls 
it “mathematician’s aphasia” – the over abstraction of problems so all semblance to 
reality is lost, and then the forgetting that the abstraction has taken place. Stephen 
Jay Gould (1996) raises other points about reification (mistaking the abstract for the 
reality it supposedly proxies). Having a proxy stand for something with which it may 
have only the very slightest relationship is one thing, but where things often go awry 
is that authors then draw conclusions as if the proxies were the thing they stand in 
for. Such research is therefore not adding to truth but actually misleading and 
obscuring any “truth”. Gould’s concern was the gross simplification of a complex and 
multi-dimensional phenomena such as human intelligence as a single measure of IQ 
that could then be compared on a linear scale. For many researchers IQ became 
human intelligence, with all of its subsequent racial and other social policy prejudices 
that it entailed. ‘Bad positivism’ doesn’t just lead to poorly thought out research 
publications.  
Interpretation: Perhaps where this all falls down most profoundly is in the 
interpretation of the results. So little reflection is learnt, encouraged or exhibited in 
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the solipsists journals so that the honest and modest reflection upon the profound 
limitations of the research (any research really) are lost and speculative and tentative 
conclusions are offered as facts.  Too often the researcher’s role here is left out. 
Once our students are taught to don the white coat, they are personally removed 
from the scholarship and only a few mavericks seem able to recognise this fact. 
Even then, engaging with this `bad positivism’ of others always runs the risk of 
contamination (as some parts of this conversation have shown) and perhaps even 
help in the social construction of these facts and the reification of the approach. How 
one deals with that is a more complex problem 
But we cannot leave this hurried attempt to engage with the present paper without 
recognition of the central role of power and influence in what passes for the 
construction of knowledge in accounting (Tinker and Puxty, 1995). A great many 
colleagues who might choose to do more questioning work simply do not believe that 
they have the freedom to do so. They believe, with more than a little foundation that 
if they wish to keep their job (see, for example, Bebbington and Dillard, 2007) they 
have to do `this stuff`. As Patten (2002) expresses it “To the positivist world I am too 
radical, but in the radical world I am too much the positivist. I am a boat person in the 
world of accounting research” (Patten, 2002; p8) and he makes a more general point 
not just about the climate in which many scholars work but the political choices one 
makes about where one believes change may be made more (or less) possible. The 
challenge Patten suggests is to attack the bad positivists and make common cause 
with the boat people of academic research. 
4. So what might we research and how might we do it? 
The sword of truth must be safeguarded within the sheath of goodness...In the modern world there is 
far too much emphasis on truth, on science, on physical facts, on measurement, and not enough on 
goodness, on compassion, on meaning and on wisdom. The balance needs to be restored. Satish 
Kumar (2014), Resurgence & Ecologist, no 284, May/June, (p.1) 
It is not difficult to find exciting and innovative work that takes a positive research 
slant on SEA. Modesty prevents us from identifying a number of such pieces but 
work such as Blacconiere and Patten (1994); Bouten et al (2012); Brown and 
Deegan (1998); Deegan and Rankin (1996); Neu et al (1998); Roberts (1992); all 
illustrate what can done with inventive and thoughtful quantitative exploration 
grounded on wider reading.  So, in our view, the type of method chosen is simply not 
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the issue:  there are poor close readings, superficial ethnographies and bland 
descriptive case studies for that matter.  
The issue is that the researcher should be asking an interesting question as part of 
an important problem informed by wider reading. Far too often this appears not to be 
the case with SEA (as with other) research. Mindless content analysis, predictable 
questionnaires and, generally, research into social, environmental or sustainability 
issues by researchers who patently know little or nothing about society, the natural 
environment or sustainability28, are not what humanity has need of just now.  
Why would one undertake research into SEA? If the desire is simply to get a PhD 
and/or publish there are so many more fruitful areas that one could focus upon. If 
one wants to research SEA then the question has to be `why?` – what is the political, 
social, moral and/or policy motivation that is manifest in your study? Getting 
published in a ‘top’ journal simply doesn’t cut it. SEA would be part of a more fruitful 
literature and generate wider and more substantive discussion if authors could, for 
example, explain why they want to enquire into matters such as whether some 
relatively vacuous social or environmental disclosure seems to influence investors.  
Even with an investor or managerial point of view it could still be interesting to 
explore such matters as: the extent to which companies had tight, financial 
Friedman-style decision making; how different business cases were constructed; 
how and why corporations engage in apparent altruism and/or true philanthropy (see 
especially Campbell, 2007); why (as Bannerjee, 2007; for example raises) 
companies are so keen to portray themselves as socially responsible or sustainable; 
and how and why investors (social or otherwise) would be so stupid as to believe 
them;  how far do/can environmental managers push the accounting conventions in 
investment appraisal?; and so on. There are many interesting and important 
questions to which, in all probability, imaginative and informed quantitative analysis 
can bring helpful insights and suggest new hypotheses.  
A wider perspective offers unlimited possibilities where imaginative researchers – 
whatever their preferred (or required) method allegiance - can continue to challenge 
                                                          
28
 An interesting question arises about how does a new researcher research anything when they know so little 
about it? How might an extant researcher redirect their efforts whilst not being an expert?  The simple 
answers (and it is a complex question) would suggest that training should be in the subject matter and its 
content: techniques are much less important; and that secondly, as we have argued above, how can you justify 
your question as interesting if, indeed, you know nothing about it?  
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perceptions and open new possibilities.  Some suggestions include such matters as: 
why do stakeholders not penalise irresponsible behaviour (the case of British 
Petroleum (as was) continues to fascinate)?; how are `the rules of the game’ set/not 
set and consequently how might we define `responsible behaviour`?; to what extent 
can ecological data be mapped onto organisations?; how has the marginal 
development of the law on social and environmental disclosure actually come about? 
Has it changed anything?; how are indices like Dow Jones Sustainability or FTSE 4 
Good, actually constructed and why does anybody take them seriously? What do all 
those companies, institutions, professionals and, especially academics think they 
mean when they say `sustainability`?  
What we do know is that such social and environmental disclosure as does take 
place does not discharge any wider accountability – or if it does it does so in only the 
very vaguest of terms and under the most trivial of assumptions. Similarly, we know 
that commercial organisations – and especially large and quoted commercial 
organisations have major social and environmental effects and that a priori their 
contribution to un-sustainability is compelling. Even good managerialist research 
could tell us more about this (see, for example, Young and Tilley, 2006) and if 
quantitative methods help us better engage with these issues, let us have more of 
that too. There is in fact considerable potential to what carefully crafted, well 
informed, positivist-based quantitative research design can meaningfully deliver to 
the social accounting project. The trick is, however, to keep one’s primary focus on 
the research problem/issue, and not the methods (and attendant questions) 
permitted in the banal and facile publications of so-called ‘top’ journals.  
We sit on a dying planet facing unprecedented levels of inequality and species 
extinction. There is a job needing doing and we, personally, don’t much care how it 
gets done. As the mischievous misquote from the French revolution said of 
sociologists “give us the tools and we’ll spend all day sharpening them”. If that ever 
became true of SEA it would be an appalling indictment. As Howard Zinn (1997, pp. 
499-507) in the Uses of Scholarship so acutely observes:  
...the new urgency to use our heads for good purposes gets tangled in a cluster of 
beliefs...roughly expressed by the phrases “disinterested scholarship”, “dispassionate 
learning”, “objective study”, “scientific method” – all adding up to the fear that using our 
intelligence to further our moral ends is somehow improper. And so we remain 
subservient to the beliefs of the profession although they violate our deepest feelings as 
human beings... 
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Zinn’s response is to point out many of these beliefs are simply myths and 
institutional routines that are both capable of challenge, and from which we can 
escape. Of course ‘values’ should determine the questions we ask, but not the 
answers we provide. We must learn to avoid the false dichotomy between fact and 
value, between the is and the ought, and overthrow the false belief that science is 
neutral and unbiased, and the scientist must remain disinterested, objective, and 
unemotional  -  the enemy being, according to Zinn, over specialisation and too 
narrow a reading. Zinn (1997, p.505) notes Rousseau’s complaint that: 
We have physicists, geometricians, chemists, astronomers, poets, musicians, and 
painters in plenty, but we have no longer a citizen among us. 
In challenging the abdication of moral responsibility of the learned, Rousseau 
(Capaldi & Lloyd, 2010, p.65) went on to suggest that: 
...so long as power is alone on one side, and knowledge and understanding alone on the 
other, the learned will seldom make great objects their study, princes will still more rarely 
do great actions, and the peoples will continue to be, as they are, mean, corrupt, and 
miserable.  
For us, it really does matter what you do, but how you do it (assuming you it do it 
well) seems much less important. To favour method over problem selection at this 
stage in the history of humanity (and those remaining species that still have a 
history) is patently absurd, morally outrageous (especially so for scholars of SEA, but 
for that matter any servant of the public purse), and clearly a form of madness.  
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